

Malware-DNA: Machine Learning for Malware Analysis that Treats Malware as Mutations in the Software Genome

Maksim E. Eren^{**}, Kim O. Rasmussen[♦], Charles Nicholas[#], Boian S. Alexandrov[♦]

^{*}LANL Analytical Division, [♦]LANL Theoretical Division, [#]UMBC

Contact: maksim@lanl.gov

Objective

- Malware is one of the most dangerous and costly cyber threats to national security.
- Classifying a malware sample into a family aids in understanding the behavior of the malware, which is helpful for estimating the severity of the threat and developing mitigation strategies.
- Prior malware defense solutions do not sufficiently address a number of real-world challenges** slowing down the adoption of ML-based solutions against malware threats despite the cost savings:

- [Considering the cost associated with labeled malware](#)
- [Using supervised solutions that poorly generalize to new malware](#)
- [Detecting both rare and prominent malware families](#)
- [Incorporating the ability to identify new/novel malware families](#)

Malware-DNA: ML method that considers software analogous to the genomic DNA, malware as malicious mutations (e.g., cancer) in the software genome, and targets extraction and recognition of *accurate* mutational malware signatures.

- Using the ideas of our [2021 R&D 100 winning SmartTensors AI Platform](#)^[1,4], we introduce a **new ML method for malware family classification and novel malware family detection** that achieves state-of-the-art results while **addressing the major shortcomings in the field**.

REFERENCES


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[1] Boian Alexandrov, Velimir Vesselinov, and Kim Orskov Rasmussen. SmartTensors Unsupervised AI platform for Big-Data Analytics. Technical Report, Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States), 2021. LA-UR-21-25064.

[2] Anderson, Hyrum S., and Phil Roth. "Ember: an open dataset for training static PE malware machine learning models." arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.04637 (2018).


[3] Ding, Y., Liu, J., Xiong, J., & Shi, Y. (2020). Revisiting the evaluation of uncertainty estimation and its application to explore model complexity- uncertainty trade-off. In Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (pp. 4-5). [8]

Rantos, K., A. Spyros, A. Papanikolaou, A. Kritsas, C. Ilioudis, and V. Katos, [4] Eren, M.E., Bhattarai, M., Nicholas, C., Rasmussen K., and Alexandrov, B. (2023), Data Identification and Classification Method, Apparatus, and System, US, Provisional Patent 63/472,188.



Method

- We first build an archive of identifying latent software signatures via hierarchical factorization which includes estimation of the number of latent signals^[1].




- S1:** Extract observational features from labeled malware.
- S2:** Non-negative factorization of the observational data X which gives us a factor matrix W (k columns are the latent signatures) and H (rows are the magnitudes of each of the k signatures).
- S3:** Apply a custom clustering which assigns each of the samples to one of the k signature-clusters.
- S4:** When a uniform cluster is identified, i.e. a cluster which contains specimens from the same family, we add the annotated cluster centroid to our archive of signatures.
- Otherwise, we continue with successive factorizations in a hierarchical manner to separate the mixed latent signatures.
- New sample identification:** Project a new sample onto the archive using Non-negative Least Squares Solver (NNLS), and obtain a similarity score.


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Reject-Option

- The reject-option is the ability for our ML model to be able to say both *"This is a known malware!"*, and *"I do not know what this is!"*. Based on the similarity score obtained from the NNLS projection and a **threshold t** , we can characterize the new known specimen:




- With the reject-option, we can abstain from making a prediction when an unknown specimen is seen:



Experiments

- Using the EMBER-2018^[2] dataset, we randomly sample **20k malware specimens** from families **ramnit**, **adposhel**, **emotet**, **zusy**. We select **ramnit** to represent a novel family.
- The performance of our method is reported with the *Area Under the Curve of Risk-Coverage*^[3] (AURC, where lower is better), and the accuracy score.
- We achieve a great AURC score of 0.038:** which means that at ~50% coverage we get an accuracy score of ~0.99 and correctly identify ~99% of **ramnit** as novel.



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